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Abstract
When repo margins are raised by a central clearing counterparty (CCP),
the impact on security prices depends on whether the market is ‘long’ or
‘short’. As both the long and the short must post margins, the price impact
depends on which side is more leveraged: traders long in the security or
those short-selling it. If a raised margin forces more position unwind from
the long than from the short, the price will go down to clear the market.
However, if short positions are more hit then the long ones, a raised haircut
leads to a higher security price!
1 We are thankful to comments from the audience at the SAET 2017 conference (June
2017). G. Ramı́rez was supported by a doctoral grant given by FCT, Portugal (grant





Without rehypothecation, raised margin typically decreases the price of the collat-
eral (houses prices for mortgage, or the price of other collateral used to asset back
securities). In fact, the only leverage provided is to the long side of the collateral
market, who is funding collateral purchases. Reduced leverage, everything else
being equal, means less buying and hence a lower collateral price.
The situation is less clear, however, in the presence of rehypothecation, for
example in the securities markets. Securities serve as collateral when financing
their own purchase and then cash lenders manage to repledge or short sell2 the
collateral they have accepted. That is, in these markets, self-collateralization com-
bined with collateral reuse allow for short positions. Since leverage is provided to
both the long and the short side, the price impact of a leverage reduction can also
go either way. With central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs), both the long
side and the short side need to post margin and are thus affected by variation of
haircut3: it is well documented how higher volatility (or just higher spreads on
yields of sovereign bonds relative to a AAA benchmark) make CCPs (and futures
exchanges) increase the initial margins charged in repo trades to both sides of the
market4, agents that pledge securities and agents that accept these as collateral
for cash loans. positions
It has been argued, in most of the literature we review below, that the impact
of higher haircuts is always to lower the price of the collateral. If this were true this
would mean that raising margin is always procyclical : if the price of the collateral
2 The counterparties to these shorts can also repledge the securities (an indirect rehypothe-
cation) and a new iteration starts.
3 Stricly speaking, the haircut indicates, in percentage terms, how the loan falls below the
collateral value, whereas the initial margin expresses the collateral as a percentage of the
loan (it is therefore the inverse of one minus the haircut).
4 It should be clear that a similar analysis can be done replacing security with deliverable
futures and haircut with futures initial margin.
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is already under pressure, a higher haircut pushes it further down in some vicious
cycle that in the worst case can feed on itself.
However, to take just an example, if we observe what happened in the European
sovereign debt crisis, we see yields dropping after some margins were raised. This
is more notorious for the 10 year government bonds of the following countries and
for the following episodes: Ireland, 12 and 26 November 2010 and again for the
six consecutive margin increases from April through June 2011; Italy, 9 Nov 2011
and July 2012; Portugal, 11 May 2011 and 29 June 2011; Spain, 20 June 2012.
There are nevertheless also some down spirals in prices5, but this is certainly not
the most frequent market reaction after margins are raised. Later, in particular for
Irish and Spanish bonds, as the crisis started to fade away, speculation decreased
and the fall in haircuts was accompanied by a fall in yields.
There may be other factors behind such yield movement, but it does suggest
that the impact of raising margin is not always to push the price of the collateral
down. Our view is that in securities markets it depends on positioning. For this
reason, as positioning changes quickly over time, one can expect the impact of
margins to be more visible in short term market reactions rather than in long
term trends. It is well-known that at various times speculative positions were
quite significant. This raises the possibility that raising haircut could at times
have had more impact on the short side. And a contributing factor of yields going
down is shorts being the leveraged traders being forced to deleverage when margin
is raised. In market parlance, a security market is long when the longs are the more
leveraged agents and short when it is the shorts that are more leveraged instead.
We will give a more precise definition for a terminology that superficially seems
to clash with market clearing (which requires longs and shorts to be matched).
The emphasis is on where the leverage is when the haircut rises. If the short side
5 19 November 2010 and 25 March 2011 for Ireland; throughout April 2011 and on 14 June
2011 for Portugal
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gets to be reduced more than the long side (which happens when ‘the market is
short’), then the price of the security going up, everything else being equal, enables
markets to clear.
2 Relation with the Literature
Most of the literature emphasized the procyclical role of repo haircuts and the re-
sulting propagating down-spiral. Adrian and Shin (2009) observe a strong positive
correlation between leverage and balance sheet size of US financial intermediaries,
inferring from it a procyclical role of leverage. A theoretical work by Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) notices that short selling also requires capital in the form
of margin and provides an interesting result pointing out that a margins spiral
arises when long margins are decreasing in prices or short margins are increasing
in prices. It seems to be implicit that prices might increase with short margins and
that a counter-cyclical pattern could happen if the short margins were decreasing
in prices, just like the long margins.
The observed, not so infrequent, escapes of what just before looked like an
implacable vicious circle logic motivated us. When, in response to a price drop
and volatility, margins are increased and the price subsequently rises, is the raised
margin a contributing factor to this rise or does the rise in price happen in spite
of a headwind margin effect? We suggest that the margin effect can sometimes be
supportive: higher margin also can nudge prices higher.
In the empirical literature, the analysis that Gorton and Metrick (2012) did
of the 2008 financial crisis argued that the spiral interaction of repo haircuts and
prices of structured securities led to a run on repo and insolvency of the US banking
system. While that pro-cyclicality may have actually occurred in what was then
a long market for those securities, Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) downplayed its
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magnitude and impact on the whole financial system. These different assessments
may be due, as Infante (2015) pointed out, to Gorton and Metrick (2012) having
focused on bilateral trades, while in the large US tri-party market haircuts may
have been changed much less. We argue for a balanced view: in a market with
both longs and shorts, leverage by itself does not have to be procyclical, it depends
where leverage is more prevalent.
In any case, the presumed procyclical nature of margins set by CCPs (more
systematic than in over-the-counter (OTC) market) has even led to the view that
CCPs might be factor of instability. This view was nevertheless met with some
scepticism by European policy-makers that value CCPs’ role as a firewall against
the propagation of default shocks and find an increasingly centrally cleared market
easier to monitor (see Constâncio (2012)).
In the case of the European sovereign debt crisis, a lot of positioning was done
by banks (hedges of illiquid position) and hedge funds. We find tracking CCP
margin a good way to gauge evolution of margins relevant to those agents. Not
just because Banks tend to use CCPs but all relevant margins have be moving
broadly together: (1) hedge funds use prime brokers who act as clearers for them
(also charging margin regardless of whether the trader is short or long) (2) Futures
contracts (where the exchange asks for initial margin regardless of position direc-
tion). Our focus on central clearing was not chosen only for analytical purposes
but also seems to fit better with what happened in that crisis we chose to illustrate
our point.
There is an important literature that has studied collateral in the general equi-
librium (GE) theory tradition and this is the literature that is closest related to our
work. The papers by Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (1997) set
the stage: radically changing the way borrowing is treated in GE models, replacing
abstract negative asset positions (subject to exogenous naive constraints) by loans
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secured by assets. Subsequently, many contributions explored implications of how
collateral margins are set (like absence of Ponzi schemes6, welfare properties7 or
the volatility of collateral prices8) but the most relevant to our theme are the pa-
pers on how leverage impacts asset prices, stemming from Geanakoplos (2003).
In particular, the papers by Geanakoplos (2010), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012)
and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), contemplate a continuum of traders, with dif-
ferent beliefs on binominal asset returns, and compare unsecured borrowing with
borrowing against a collateral which is either a durable good or a financial asset
that cannot be short-sold.
One of the main insights of these three seminal papers is that leverage makes
the price of the asset that serves as collateral rise. To start, leverage equilibrium
prices were shown to be greater than no-leverage prices. It was noticed that prices
increase with exogenous loan-to-value ratios, but the emphasis was then placed
on the endogenous determination of leverage (ruling out default on non-recourse
loans). The endogenous deleverage always reinforced a fall in prices caused by bad
news about the worse case payoff.
We use Fostel and Geanakoplos’ (2012) and (2015) binomial model with a
continuum of degrees of agents’ optimism on asset payoffs. We find it surprisingly
versatile and apt to illustrate rich and subtle phenomena of general relevance. We
use it to show that lower margin might not always raise asset prices, if assets can be
short sold. The key difference - more important than recourse - is if the collateral
may be reused by the creditor on whose hands it was pledged. In a nutshell: Asset
prices increase with leverage in a long market and decrease in a short market. In
a long market the optimists are leveraged, while it is the pessimists who are if it is
short. To make the comparison easier, our examples are as close as possible to the
6 See Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) and Kubler and Schmeders (2003).
7 See Araujo, Kubler and Schommer (2012) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2014).
8 See Brumm, Grill, Kubler and Schmeders (2015).
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framework used in those papers, in particular to the benchmark model in Fostel
and Geanakoplos (2012).
As in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012), we contemplate a binomial economy (the
initial node is followed by two nodes) and two assets, one that can be pledged as
collateral and another one that cannot. The former has stochastic returns and the
latter is riskless. We can interpret the former as a risky security and the latter
as cash. Also as in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) and Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2015), there is a continuum of agents, with the same initial holdings of assets at
the first date but differing in the weights attached to the two states of nature in
their linear utility functions.
We depart from Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) and Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2015) in three aspects. First and foremost the collateral can be reused (and short
sold). Reuse of financial collateral has always been done but had been ignored in
the literature for a long time. Recent work includes the paper by Bottazzi, Luque
and Páscoa (2012), addressing leverage and existence of reuse equilibria in OTC
markets, and the working paper by Brumm, Grill, Kubler and Schmeders (2017),
which studies volatility and welfare implications of reuse.
Second, loans are recourse, as is typically the case in repo (with an exception
allowed by the Fed during the 2008 crisis). Default is a bankruptcy trigger9 and,
therefore, not so common in repo markets. For this reason, and also for simplicity
and tractability, we focus on asset price fluctuations and look for full repayment
outcomes10.
Third, agents have endowments (of the riskless asset) also at the two nodes
9 The collateral value can be below the promised repurchase price and yet default might
not occur. On the other hand, repo collateral is exempt by the US bankruptcy code from
automatic stay and the cash lender can liquidate the collateral immediately, but if the
liquidation value exceeds (or is below) the repurchase price, the difference is deemed property
of the insolvent estate (or can be claimed against that estate, respectively).
10 Work in progress by Bottazzi, Páscoa and Ramirez (2017) discusses how bankruptcy can be
modelled but here we leave that intricate non-convex problem aside.
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of the second date. Such endowments played no role in ensuring solvency in the
non-recourse case, but we can now choose them high enough so that the shorts
can contemplate maximum leverage for a given level of haircut, without going
bankrupt at the second date.
Our model is used to construct two benchmark cases for a repo market cleared
through a CCP. One where the market is short and raising haircuts/initial margin
leads to higher security prices (as in the sovereign debts episodes mentioned above).
Another, where the market is long and raising the haircut makes that the security
price go down. What determines whether the market will be long or short is how
security returns vary across nodes by comparison with endowments of the riskless
asset. The latter might be too low (in the state where the security has higher
return) to allow for the shorts to lever up to what the haircut allows for.
The paper shows how rehypothecaction allows for counter-examples to well-
known results that had been established in the absense of such reuse of the col-
lateral. In the next section we provide a very brief motivation on the basis of
observed haircut. In section 4 we describe the model of centrally cleared repo
and in the following sections we present the examples, discussing in more detail a
short market where prices rise in response to higher margin. That being said we
cannot claim that haircuts have a stabilizing effect by themselves. First there are
many markets where leverage is only offered to the long side. Also when shorts are
possible, leveraged positioning could stabilise the price when margin is raised only
if the market would be well equipped, in the sense of having plenty of leveraged
shorts willing to take profit in any excessive down price move.
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3 Suggestive episodes
Let us now look into our illustrative example. We chose this example because
of easy access to data: the way CCPs raise repo margins when security prices
fall has been well documented and elaborated on in the literature. For European
government bonds, the major clearing houses are LCH.Clearnet Ltd (London),
LCH.Clearnet SA (Paris) and Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&G) SpA
(Rome). The first one tends to raise initial margin when spreads exceed 450
basis points over a 10 year AAA benchmark. The second and third use the same
margins model based on several indicators. Italian government bonds are the
largest collateral pool in European repo and are cleared by both LCH.Clearnet
SA and CC&G. Irish and Portuguese bonds (together with many bonds issued by
less risky countries) are traded by CLH.Clearnet Ltd, while Spanish bonds may
be cleared by both LCH branches. Several papers did a very detailed analysis of
how initial margins on 10 year bonds issued by these 4 governments responded to
yields changes11. We are interested in the other direction (but more short term)
...and use these same markets as illustration.
11 We borrow Figure 1 on the Irish bond from Altenhofen and Lohff (2013) and Figures 2
and 3 on the other three bonds from Armakola, Douady, Laurent and Molteni (2016). In
the Supplementary Material we present tables reporting haircuts and yields for the most
relevant dates.
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Figure 1: Haircuts and yield spread for 10 year Irish government bonds on 10
year German Government bond. Source: Armakola, Douady, Laurent and Molteni
(2016)
We notice that there are several episodes where yields dropped shortly after
margins went up. For the 10 year Irish bond, figure 1 shows for late 2010 and the
first half of 2011 several instances when haircut rises were immediately followed
by falls in yields. For example, when in response to a yields increase (by 9%
on the 9th of November 2010), LCH.Clearnet Ltd. announced on the 10th of
November that the initial margin would be raised on the 12th to 15%. This was
followed by decreases in yields of 7.9% and 2.7% on the 12th and the next market
date, respectively. On the 1st of April 2011, initial margins were raised to 45%
and yields dropped that day (by 2.62%), the following day (by 2.32%) and very
significantly by 5.9% on the third subsequent market day (the 6th, followed by
smaller reductions in the next four days).
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Figure 2: Haircuts and yield spread for 10 year Portuguese government bonds
on 10 year German Government bond. Source: Armakola, Douady, Laurent and
Molteni (2016)
In the case of the 10 year Portuguese bond, when margins went up from 35%
to 45% on the 11th of May 2011, the yield fell 4% that day (followed by smaller
reductions in the next 3 days) and one month later, when LCH.Clearnet Ltd.
announced on the 28th of June that margins were being raised to 80%, yields fell
by 4% that day, by 2% the next day and by 1% the following date (with further
decreases into July) .
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Figure 3: Haircuts and yield spread for 10 year Italian (left) and Spanish (right)
government bonds on 10 year German Government bond. Source: Armakola,
Douady, Laurent and Molteni (2016)
For the 10 year Italian bond, we observe that margins rose (from 6.65% to
11.65%) on the 9th of November 2011 and yields fell by 4.5% and 6.4% on the
10th and the 11th of November, respectively. After a period of lower haircuts,
margins were back at the same high level on the 23rd of July 2012 and yields fell
by 1.8%, 6.2% and 1.6% on the 25th, the 26th and 27th. For the 10 year Spanish
bond, we see that the announcement of a margins update (to 11.8%) made on the
19th of June 2012, with effect on the 21st, led to yield reductions of 2%, 5%, 2%
and 3% in the announcement date and the next three dates, respectively.
Other factors may have impacted on yields. Margin increases took place at
times when agents’ (and credit rating agencies’) perceptions of default risk may
have fluctuated, affecting also the yields. Sometimes prices go down after margin
being raised, as is noticeable for the Spanish bond from April to June 2012 and for
the Portuguese bond throughout April 2011. However, this evolution is certainly
not the rule. Even for Ireland and Portugal, where, in the first half of 2011, at a
first glance, both yields and haircuts seem to have moved around upward trends,
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when we take a closer look, we see that there are so many downward bumps in
yields happening just after rises in margins, that one suspects something almost
mechanical at work coming from leverage adjustments.
We could have looked at other examples but the particular example is not our
focus, the function of the example is mostly illustrative. Our point is theoretic
and simplified for emphasis. It is not our purpose to try to adhere to those illus-
trative empirical examples closely. However, we see the above mentioned counter-
cyclical episodes as suggesting that the speculative leveraged positions on these
four sovereign bonds can be a factor explaining why prices may rise in response to
higher margins. With this empirical motivation in mind we proceed to a theoreti-
cal analysis of the mechanisms that could possibly be at work and explain such a
behaviour.
4 The Model
4.1 An agent’s problem
We consider a binomial economy with two dates. At an initial date (date 0) there
is only one node in the event tree, followed by nodes U and D at the second date.
Figure 4: Events tree of the binomial economy.
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This economy has just one good. Agents are endowed with, trade and value it
only at the second date, in states U and D. We normalize its price to 1. At the
first date, agents have initial holdings and trade two assets, X and Y . Asset X
pays one unit of the good in each state and asset Y is a security paying Ds units of
the good in state s ∈ {U,D}, with DU < DD. The market for these assets opens
only at date 0. The price of asset X is normalized to 1 and the price of security Y
is denoted by q. There are two possible interpretations. The good can be seen as a
perishable consumption good (and X as a productive resource) or we can identify
the good with asset X (thought of as a durable good or money).
There is a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ (0, 1). All agents have the same
endowments: an unitary endowment of each asset at the initial node and state
contingent endowments ωs of the good at the second date. Agents only differ in
the weights that their linear utilities attribute to consumption CiU and C
i
D in the
U and D states, respectively:
(1) U i(CiU , C
i
D) = γ
iCiU + (1− γi)CiD,
We suppose that γ : (0, 1)→ (0, 1) is a continuous and increasing function.
At date 0, agents pledge the security Y in a repo trade. This transaction
consists in buying the security and promising to resell it at next date at a prede-
termined price. There is a difference between the price at which the title is bought,
in the first leg of the transaction, and the price at which it is resold to its original
owner, in the second leg of the transaction, at the second date. This difference is
captured by the repo rate.
The repo trade can be seen as a secured loan: in the first leg, one agent pledges
the security to get a loan that should be repaid in the second leg, at an interest
rate (the repo rate) that was locked in before. Agents take positions xi and yi on
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asset X and security Y , respectively, and at the same time can pledge ψi units
of the security in repo (in exchange for obtaining a loan with the same value
qψi) or accept θi units of the security as collateral (in exchange for giving a loan
with the same value qθi). We assumed repo contracts are settled at the security
maturity date12 . In this simple case, in the second leg, the loan is repaid (at the
predetermined repurchase price) but what is actually given back to the borrower
is just the asset payoffs.
A non-negativity constraint applies to X, repo long and repo short positions:
(2) xi, θi, ψi ≥ 0
Security positions are bounded by the interaction with repo positions. What can
be pledged as collateral cannot exceed the security long position. So far, this is
would be a traditional collateral constraint. But we go beyond, as the collateral
can be reused by the creditor: can be pledged in another repo trade or can be
sold. Selling the collateral that is temporarily in the creditor’s hands is what a
short sale is. Naked short sales, unrelated to the amount of the security that was
borrowed (accepted as collateral), are not allowed in reality and are ruled out in
our model. Hence, security position can be negative yi but short sales are bounded
by the net repo position. The box constraint captures the two-sided interaction
between security and repo positions13:
(3) yi + θi − ψi ≥ 0
In other words, the net security title balance held by each agent (in each agent’s
12 also known as repo to maturity...alternatively, a 3 dates variant of the model could be worked
out easily.
13 See Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2012) on this constraint and also Duffie (1996) for pre-
cursors of this constraint.
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“box”) must be non negative. If the reuse of the collateral were not allowed (as
in mortgages), this constraint would collapse to a plain collateral constraint of the
form yi − ψi ≥ 0.
Repo trades are centrally cleared by an exchange (also known as central clear-
ing counterparty, CCP), that charges a margin to both sides of the market, in a
proportion 1− h of the value of the repo trade14. Then, agent i budget constraint
at date 0 is as follows:
(xi − 1) + q(yi − 1) + q(θi − ψi) + (1− h)q(θi + ψi) ≤ 0(4)
Or equivalently,
(xi − 1) + q(yi − 1) + q(2− h)θi − qhψi ≤ 0(5)
At the second date, agents settle their repo obligations, using their endowments
and the returns from their first date security (long or short) positions. Repo loans
are repaid at the repo rate ρ. The CCP gives back to the agents the margins it
had collected, accrued of interest, at the same rate, the repo rate
The budget constraint for agent i in state s is as follows:
Cis = ωs + x
i + yiDs + (1 + ρ)q(θ
i − ψi) + (1 + ρ)q(1− h)(θi + ψi) ≥ 0(6)
That is,
Cis = ωs + x
i + yiDs + (1 + ρ)q[(2− h)θi − hψi] ≥ 0(7)
A plan (xi, yi, θi, ψi) is said to be feasible for agent i at prices (q, ρ) if it satisfies
14 See Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2012) on the OTC case and how haircuts are different in
that case.
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the budget constraints (5) and (7), the box constraint (3) and the non-negativity
restrictions (2). A plan that maximizes (1) among all plans that are feasible for i
at (q, ρ) is said to optimal for i given (q, ρ).
4.2 Equilibrium
The CCP collects margins from both sides of the repo market and is supposed to
pay back these margins, at the repo interest rate. To accomplish this, it should
invest the margins and there is no better way than to invest also in repo, that is,
to be also a repo long (accept the security as collateral and provide a loan, on its
own), with a position ΘEX ≥ 0.







What the CCP invests in repo is the margins it collects from both sides of the
market, that is,
















The market clearing conditions for the two asset markets are:
∫ 1
0




An equilibrium consists in prices (q, ρ) and an allocation of agents’ plans (xi, yi, θi, ψi)i∈(0,1)
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such that (i) each agent’s plan is optimal for him at these prices and (ii) asset
and repo markets clear15.
5 Short markets versus long markets
5.1 Leverage
Leverage in securities market is usually measured by the ratio of the value of
position to the down payment needed to build that position. In the case of a
long position, the purchase of the security can be financed in the repo market -
pledging the whole long position and obtaining a cash loan with the same value,
but incurring the cost of paying the margin to the CCP, that is, spending just a
fraction 1− h of the security value. Leverage is given by 1/(1− h). Analogously,
in the case of a short position, if the agent is short selling the whole collateral that
he has accepted, it presumes that he gave a cash loan of the same value and paid
a margin to the CCP. Again, the net cost is just the fraction 1− h of the security
value being shorted. So, leverage is once more given by 1/(1 − h). However, in
both cases, this is what leverage is when the agent has decided to lever up to full
potential given the haircut. Lower leverage would result if the long position were
not entirely pledged or if the short position were lower than the whole collateral
that was accepted.
Collateral reuse may play also a role in allowing for the longs to lever up to full
haircut potential. The aggregate (fully) leveraged long position, which is inversely
proportional to the haircut 1− h, may exceed what the aggregate initial holdings
were for this security. Such outcome can only satisfy market clearing if short sales
are done in equilibrium. However, how much leverage can be achieved depends
15 Second date market clearing follows from asset market clearing and the fulfillment of second
date budget constraints as equalities (due to monotonicity in preferences).
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both on how wealthy agents are and how low the haircut is.
In equilibrium and for the market at large we will say that the market is long if
net trade of longs is more sensitive to leverage than shorts’. The market is short if
higher sensitivity is with shorts. In the examples that we present in this paper we
exhibit equilibria where the longs or the shorts are levered up to full potential but
not both at the same time, hence providing clear examples of ‘long’ and ‘short’
markets. The side hitting that full leverage constraint - only one side does- will
tell us whether the market is long or short, respectively. In both cases, being
fully leveraged means that the security position (long or short, respectively) can
be built to the most that the margin downpayment allows for (by combining the
first date budget and box binding equalities)16. Second date endowments should
not be an obstacle to such leverage. That is, in the case of a short market, state D
endowments should be high enough (or margins not too low) to allow for the shorts
to fully lever while still having non-negative income (not becoming insolvent) at
that state, where security returns outweigh repo repayments. Similarly, in the case
of a long market, state U endowments should be high enough to allow for the longs
to fully lever without becoming insolvent in the state where security returns fall
below the repo repayment that is due.
Finally, we note that in both examples, the collateral gets reused. In the
‘short’ case this is obvious but we observe also that in the ‘long’ case short sales
are always done in equilibrium. The longs’ wealth (their initial holdings of the two
assets, evaluated at equilibrium prices) is high enough (by comparison with what
the haircut is), so that aggregate long positions exceed the given aggregate initial
holdings.
We will show next that, in our economy, whether the market is long or short is
what determines how increases in leverage (reductions in margin) affect the price
16 Moreover, there can not be an equilibrium where both the longs and the shorts are fully
leveraged, as shown in Appendix A.4.
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of the security.
We also identify conditions that give rise to short and long markets. Short
markets are likely to occur when the endowment in the state that short sellers
value less (ωD in this economy) is high relative to the endowment in the other
state. When ωU is high enough relative to ωD, a long market is more likely to
occur.
5.2 Leverage and prices
More formally, let us focus on equilibria where all shorts take the same short
position and all longs take the same long position, as will be the case in the
examples presented below. We refer to such equilibria as typical equilibria. There
will be a marginal agent m who is indifferent between buying or selling security
Y and we denote a typical agent in the set (m, 1) by H and a typical agent in
the set (0,m) by L. The former is a pessimist and will be a short. The latter is
an optimist and will be a long. It will be shown from first order conditions with
respect to y that when m increases q decreases.
Definition 1. We say that a typical equilibrium (q.ρ, x, y, θ, ψ) is a short (long)
market equilibrium if the net trade of a short is more (less, respectively) elastic
with respect to the loan-to-value ratio h than the net trade of a long.
In other words, in a short market it is the shorts who are more sensitive to
haircuts, to changes in leverage conditions. They they behave as being the ones
that are more leveraged. The elasticity of the net trade of a short with respect
to h measures what is the proportional change in the absolute value of the equi-
librium net trade (yH − 1) of a short in response to some proportional change in
h, by allowing all equilibrium variables to adjust to this change (that is, mutatis
mutandis). It is given by d ln(1−y
H)
d lnh
, as yH < 0. This should not be confused with
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the partial elasticity ∂ ln(1−y
H)
∂ lnh
, which assumes the security price and the repo rate
to remain constant (a ceteris paribus elasticity). Similarly, the elasticity of the net
trade of a long with respect to h measures how sensitive is the absolute value of
the net trade of a long to changes in h and is given by d ln(y
L−1)
d lnh
, for yL > 1.
Our first result establishes that the way how security prices respond to margins,
in typical equilibria, depend on whether markets are long or short.
Proposition 1. The security price q increases with the loan-to-value ratio h in a
long market but decreases with h in a short market.
Proof. Market clearing requires myL + (1−m)yH = 1. As the loan-to-value ratio
h changes, m has to change so that 1 remains a convex combination of the new









We see that m is increasing with the ratio 1−y
H
yL−1 of the absolute value of the
net trade of a short (1 − yH) to the net trade of a long (yL − 1). Hence, m
increases (and, therefore, q falls) with h if and only if the logarithm of this ratio






, or equivalently, if













In the next subsections we examine how short or long markets may arise and
see how security prices get affected by margins in both cases.
5.3 Short market
We construct an equilibrium with a short market. This type of equilibrium only
occurs when ωD is large enough so that what ends up constraining the short
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position of agents i ∈ (m, 1) is not the non-negativity of CiD but instead the
binding box constraint. The shorts sell all their endowments of assets X and Y to
build up the largest possible short position in Y . We find that the positions of a
pessimist agent H as follows:









Equation (12) shows that when it is the box constraint that bounds short-sellers’
positions, their positions are inversely related to the haircut, that is given by the
leverage 1/(1−h). We will see that this is a short market as when margin is raised
shorts need to cover more position than longs.
Denote a typical agent in the set (0,m) by L. This is a buyer of both X and
Y . From market clearing in the security we see that the security long position of











If the agents that are long in Y are pledging it (ψL > 0) and not doing any reverse
repo (θL = 0), the repo market clearing condition (9) requires









The box constraint requires yL − ψL ≥ 0, which holds if and only if
(16) h/2 ≥ (1−m)1 + q
q
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There will be a slack in the box of the non-levered agent L if (16) holds as a strict
inequality. The other positions of agent L satisfy
(17) CLU = 0, C
L




Agents in (0,m) are moving all their consumption from state U to state D,
that is, CLU = 0.
To be sure that these plans are optimal for each agent, we write agent i’s
optimization problem in terms of three choice variables, yi, θi and ψi. We denote
EiD = γiDU + (1− γi)DD, which is agent i’s expected payment of security Y . On
the right of each restriction we write the corresponding Lagrange multiplier.
max
Eiω + (1 + q) + (EiD − q)yi + q(2− h)ρθi − qhρψi
s.t.
xi = (1 + q)− qyi − q(2− h)θi + qhψi ≥ 0 (µix)
yi + θi − ψi ≥ 0 (µi)
Cis = ωs + (1 + q) + (Ds − q)yi + q(2− h)ρθi − qhρψi ≥ 0 (λis)
θi ≥ 0 (νiθ), ψi ≥ 0 (νiψ)
The first order conditions (FOC) of the problem of agent i ∈ (0, 1) are:
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Notice that an agent may have both θi and ψi positive only if the multiplier µi for
the box constraint is zero.
Given that X pays a null interest rate, we look for equilibria where the repo
rate is zero as well17. For agents i, with i > m, the first order conditions are





µH = q(2− h)µHx > 0
νHθ = 0















Shorts have positive shadow values for both the box constraint (a possession value
of the collateral, due to the desire to short sell) and the non-negativity constraint
on X (expressing a wish to do a ”‘naked short sale”’ in X). If the former were
positive and the latter zero, the repo rate would have to be negative, below the
zero interest rate on X.
17 In Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) the secured interest rate was also zero. If X had stochastic
returns, the repo rate could fall in between the implied interest rates on X, interpretable as
interest on reserves (IOR).
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From these conditions, it follows that if agent m ∈ (0, 1) is indifferent between
buying or selling Y the following condition must hold:
EmD = q(18)
Assumption 1: We assume that ωU = 0 but ωD is high enough so that C
H
D ≥ 0,






Agents’ beliefs are given by γi = i. The equilibrium price q for the security












where q = EmD = mDU +(1−m)DD. Solving for m as a function of h allows us to
find the equilibrium price q of the security, for different values of h. By combining
equations (18) and (19) we see that the security price q decreases with h:
Proposition 2. If commodity endowments satisfy Assumption 1, then the market
is short and the security price decreases as leverage goes up (and therefore as
margins decrease).
We present the proof in Appendix A.3 and prefer to present here a numerical
illustration. Consider an economy where DU = 0.70, DD = 1.15. As leverage
1
1−h
increases, the price of the security goes down. Figure 5 shows how the equilib-
rium security price decreases with the loan-to-value ratio h, along the black curve.
Condition (16) should hold in equilibrium, this is the case in the region below the
gray curve. Equation (19) is depicted by the black curve (when (16) holds) and
its dashed continuation (when (16) is not met).
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Figure 5: q vs. h - Short market
We have shown that for given security payoffs (DU and DD), there are plenty
of margin coefficients compatible with equilibria (all haircuts 1−h associated with
points on the black solid curve of Figure 5). Higher loan-to-value ratios (h) imply
lower security prices, in these short market equilibria.
In the Appendix A.1 we provide some comments on the above short market
equilibria (a comparison of outcomes for two different haircuts, how other repo
trades could be constructed for the longs and why netting would not change our
results). In Appendix A.2 we present the long market equilibria, where security
prices increase with leverage, just like in models without collateral reuse.
6 Concluding remarks
We adapted the binomial model in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012 and 2015) to
repo markets, where securities trades can be financed and through which securi-
ties may be shorted. The repo party pledges a security to get a cash loan. The
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reverse repo counterparty proving the loan can reuse the collateral by short selling
it. Repo loans are full recourse. For non-recourse loans and non-reusable collat-
eral, leverage always makes the collateral price increase. In our self-collateralised
securities market case, such implication holds only if the corresponding security
market is ‘long’ - meaning people long the security are more leveraged than those
who are short. On the contrary, if the security market is ‘short’, more leverage
pushes the security price down. In Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012 and 2015) the
asset market would always be long in our terminology as leverage is only provided
to purchase the asset.
Repo market is typically full recourse, but we do not think the recourse/non-
recourse aspect is key to drive our conclusion. On the other hand, rehypothecation
to the extent that it is a precondition of even being able to short is a key difference.
When leverage can be taken on both the long and short side what matters is on
which side leverage is used. The adjustment mechanism goes as follows. Looking
at the impact of raised margin requirements separately for agents with a long or a
short position in the asset, leverage reduction will mean reduction of position for
both. The price of the asset is the balancing factor that restores market clearing.
If the position of a short is reduced by more than the position of a long - in
what we call a ‘short’ market - the price of the security will go up. The reverse
happens when the market is ‘long’ and it has been the case studied by Fostel
and Geanakoplos (2012), as this is the only possible outcome for the price of a
house securing a mortgage, or for the price of other collateral used to asset back
securities.
Positioning (market ‘long’ or ‘short’) is the driver of whether the price of the
security will go up or down when leverage is adjusted.
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A Appendix
A.1 Comments on the short market equilibria
1) Comparing two equilibria: To gain more intuition, let us see look at equilibria
generated by two different haircuts, 1% and 3%. Figures 6 and 7 show the security
and repo positions for the continuum of agents in the two equilibria.
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(a) yi (b) θi and ψi
Figure 6: Equilibrium corresponding to haircut of 1% (h = 0.99): m = 0.881,
q = 0.754, xi = 1/m for i ≤ m and xi = 0 for i > m (assuming ωD ≥ 107.6).
(a) yi (b) θi and ψi
Figure 7: Equilibrium corresponding to haircut of 3% (h = 0.97): m = 0.801,
q = 0.789, xi = 1/m for i ≤ m and xi = 0 for i > m (assuming ωD ≥ 34.7).
An agent above the marginal agent (i > m) is short selling the whole collateral
that was pledged to him. An agent below the marginal agent (i < m) is long in
the security but pledging less than the long position.
Market clearing requires myL+(1−m)yH = 1. As the haircut increases, m has
to change so that 1 remains a convex combination of the new positions yL and yH .
Now, the graphs on the left-hand-side of Figures 6 and 7 show that, as the haircut
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is raised, the fully leveraged (individual) short position |yH | falls much more than
the (individual) long position yL. The short position yH changes from −232.7 to
−75.6 (is 32% of what it was before), while the long position yL changes from 32.7
to 20.0 (is still 61% of what it was before). Both yH and yL got closer to 1, but
the former much more than the latter. The weights on the convex combination
must reflect that: m falls and, therefore, q = EmD rises.
We saw in the proof of Proposition 1 that m is increasing with the ratio 1−y
H
yL−1
of the absolute value of the net trade of a short (1 − yH) to the net trade of a
long (yL − 1). In a short market, this ratio falls as the haircut is raised. Figure
8 illustrates how m and q vary as this ratio changes. In the first graph we see
that this ratio is the slope of a ray joining the origin to the point representing net
trade positions of the two typical agents. The second graph takes an amplified
look at what happens closer to the origin, where m can be found as the vertical
coordinate of the point where the ray crosses the simplex. Such m induces q =
DD − (DD −DU)m, read on the horizontal axis.
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(a) Net trades of longs and shorts (b) m and q determined from net trades ratio
Figure 8
2) On other repo positions for the non-levered agents : as the non-levered longs
have null shadow values for the box constraint, the above security trades could
be implemented with other repo positions for the longs (and the CCP). Each long
could take positions θ̃L and ψ̃L on both sides of the repo market and have no slack
in the box (θ̃L = ψ̃L − yL). This is not the same as pledging the long position in
exchange for the net repo loan. Being on both sides of the market entails an extra
margin, which will be given back by the CCP in the second leg. That is, the long
is at the same time lending cash to the CCP (at the repo rate), thereby undoing
partially his secured borrowing. What marks the difference between levered and
non-levered agents is not so much whether there is no slack in the box but rather
how tied up is the security position (long or short) to the opposite repo position
(short or long, respectively).
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Such alternative repo trades would not change how q relates to h. Market
clearing requires both (2 − h)(1 − m)θH + (2 − h)mθ̃L = hmψ̃L and myL =




. It is easy to see that
θ̃L ≥ 0 (and ψ̃L ≥ yL ≥ ψL) if and only if (16) holds and, therefore, equilibrium
prices q are still related to h according to the solid black curve of Figure 5.
3) On netting of clients repo positions: we have assumed that the repo short
and long positions of each agent do not get netted for the purposes of assessing
marginable positions. However, our results are robust to full or partial netting18.
As shown in section A.5, conditions (16) and (19) still hold under full or partial
netting (and, therefore, also Figure 5). The only interesting difference is that under
full netting, repo portfolios of non-levered agents will be uniquely determined, for
each haircut: non-levered agents can no longer have alternative repo portfolios
with positions on both sides of the market (those discussed in Comment 2)).
A.2 Long market
A long market is more likely to occur when ωU is large relative to ωD. The
equilibrium is again characterized by a marginal agent m ∈ (0, 1). The set (m, 1)
of agents has a typical agent denoted by H and the set (0,m) has a typical agent
denoted by L. Now, the agents with high valuations (the optimists) of the expected
return of security Y have long positions on the security and are leveraged, leading
18 LCH.Clearnet does partial netting (see LCH.Clearnet SA (2011)): the marginable position
is a repo long or short position decremented by the following: the minimum of the two
multiplied by a factor significantly less than one.
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naturally to a long market as can be seen below.


































CHU > 0 C
H
D = 0
The box constraint of the non-levered shorts holds if and only if yH + θH ≥ 0, or
equivalently, for
(26) h/2 ≤ 1−m1 + q
q
The problem of the agents is the same as in the short market example. For
the positions presented above, the first order conditions are satisfied when agents’
positive multipliers are the following: µLx =
ELD−q
q(1−h) , µ
L = qhµLx , ν
L





We will consider the case when the parameters of the economy are all as before
with only one exception: we interchange the values of the endowments ωU and ωD.
Let DU = 0.70, DD = 1.15. We assume now
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Agents’ beliefs are again given by γi = i. Now, CHD = 0 implies that leverage












where m = DD−q
DD−DU
.
In Figure 9, condition (26) holds the region above the gray curve. Combining
conditions (27) and (26) we get a lower bound on h compatible with ψH ≥ 0. For
h above that lower bound (h ≥ 0.96189), equation (27) describes how q evolves
with h. The black curve in Figure 9 illustrates how the security price increases
with the loan-to-value ratio h (and, therefore, with leverage) in the long market19.
This relationship is generalized in the following proposition, proven in section A.3:
Proposition 3. If commodity endowments satisfy Assumption 2, then the mar-
ket is long and the security price increases as leverage goes up (and therefore as
margins decrease).




1−h ≥ 1. By (27), we get y
H < 0 if and only if (1−m)(1+q)
DD−q
+ 1 ≥ 1,
which holds trivially.
19 As in the short market examples, we could have allowed now each non-levered short to be
just predominantly repo long, rather than exclusively repo long, with no slack in the box,
but still with a (short) security position less tied up the (long) repo position, than is the
case for the long counterparties.
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Figure 9: q vs. h - Long market
A.3 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
We show that under Assumptions 1 or 2, the security price decreases or increases,
respectively, with h, which also implies that the market is short or long, respec-
tively, by the argument in the proof of Proposition 1.
For given a value of h, the equilibrium price of the security must satisfy the



































(1 + q)(1−m)2(q −DU)
[(1−m)(1 + q) +m(1 + q)− q +DU ]
=
q(1 +DU)
(1 + q)(1−m)2(q −DU)
> 0






(1−m)(1 + q̄)2(1− q̄DU)2
[
(1− q̄DU)2 +m(1 + q̄)2DU
]
> 0(28)
This implies that ∂H
∂q
< 0 and that along any isoleverage curve (obtained by fixing











> 0 we get that, for a fixed value of q, increasing m implies moving to
a isoleverage curve corresponding to a higher value of H. The new security price
that solves the two-equation system is then found at the intersection of this curve
and the straight line given by (18) (q = DD +m(Du −DD)). This implies that as
leverage H increases, the price of the security q must decrease as shown in Figure
10.
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Figure 10: Impact of leverage on equilibrium when the market is short
There is another condition that must hold in equilibrium. It is condition (16),
ensuring that the box constraints is satisfied for the non-levered longs. Eliminating
h in the system formed by equation (18) and the equality version of (16), we get
a quadratic equation in q, for each m, whose two roots are described by curves c1
and c2 in Figure 10. The grey region in Figure 10 is the set of points (m, q) where
q ∈ [DU , DD] and (16) holds. Equilibrium pairs (m, q) are found within this region
where each isoleverage (for some h) crosses the dashed line representing (18). The
isoleverages portrayed in the figure are for the haircuts of 1% and 3%, as in the
numerical example of section 5.3 (and for its parameter values for D and ω).
An analogous argument proves that, in a long market, prices increase with
increases in leverage, as in Proposition 3. To see this simply note that now equi-


















(1 + q)(1− m̄)2(DD − q)
> 0
Which in turn implies that now ∂H
∂m




m(1 + q̄)2(DDq̄ − 1)2
[
(DDq̄ − 1)2 + (1−m)(1 + q̄)2DD
]
< 0(29)
This implies that ∂H
∂q
> 0 and, therefore, along each isoleverage we have dq
dm
> 0.
Now higher leverage implies moving to a isoleverage to the left. This implies a
higher price q for the security and a lower value of m. This is illustrated in Figure
11.
Figure 11: Impact of leverage on equilibrium when the market is long
Equilibrium requires in addition that (26) should hold in a long market. This
ensures that the box constraint of the non-levered shorts is satisfied. For q ∈
[DU , DD], such condition holds in the grey region of Figure 11 (constructed from
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curves c1 and c2 showing where the equality version of (26) holds together with
(27)).
A.4 The longs and the shorts can not be both fully lever-
aged
Suppose we had both short and long agents fully leveraged. This would imply:




Market clearing in the securities market would imply:
















On the other hand, from equation (9), market clearing in the repo market would
imply:
(2− h)(1−m)θH − hmψL = 0⇔ (2− h)(1−m)− hm = 0
⇔ m = 2− h
h
(31)
Combining equations (30) and (31) we get:









This equation holds only if 1 + q = q, which is impossible for any positive price q.
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The fact that the CCP is investing the margin in repo is not crucial for the
above argument. Suppose instead that the CCP buys asset Xwith the margins it
collects. Since both long and short agents are fully leveraged, they would not be
buying X. Now market clearing for asset X would require:





⇔ 1 + q = q(32)
Which is again impossible for any positive price q.
A.5 Netting
Suppose that for given repo and reverse repo positions, ψ and θ, the CCP defines
the respective marginable positions, ψ̂ and θ̂ as follows
θ̂ = θ −min{θ, ψ}α(33)
ψ̂ = ψ −min{θ, ψ}α(34)
For α = 1 there is full netting, for α = 0 there is no netting, while for α ∈ (0, 1)
there is partial netting. To avoid non-convexities, we introduce variables v1 and
v2 related to marginable positions
20
(1− h)θ̂ ≤ v1, (1− h)ψ̂ ≤ v2(35)
x = 1 + q[1− (y + θ − ψ)− (v1 + v2)](36)
Cs = ωs + 1 + q + (Ds − q)y + ρq(θ − ψ + v1 + v2)(37)
20 We make (35) hold as equalities in equilibrium.
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For ρ = 0, FOC with respect to θi and ψi are now given, respectively, by
µiq + (1− h)µixq(1− αγi) = µi + νiθ(38)
µiq − (1− h)µixq(1− α(1− γi)) = µi + νiψ(39)
where γi is 1 when min{θ, ψ} < ψ, is 0 when min{θ, ψ} < θ and belongs to [0, 1]
otherwise. Take the case of a short market. FOC hold if all multipliers are as
in section 5.3 except for νHψ which is now equal to qµ
H
x (1 − h)(2 − α). We have
vH1 = (1− h)θH , vH2 = 0, vL1 = (1− h)(1− α)θL and vL2 = (1− h)(ψL − αθL).
Asset and repo portfolios reported in 5.3 are still equilibrium portfolios and
conditions (16) and (19) still hold under full or partial netting (and, therefore,
also Figure 5), that is, our result is robust to full or partial netting21.
Notice that in the case of full netting, there is no need to use separate variables
for repo and reverse repo positions: we can use a signed variable z to denote the
net repo trade (reverse repo minus repo) with marginable position defined by |z|
(which amounts to having α = 1 in formulas (35)). Partial netting seems to be
the current practice (LCH.Clearnet stipulates different coefficients α for bonds of
different maturities, but always with α < 1).
21 Moreover, for partial netting, alternative portfolios can again be constructed for the non-
levered longs (with positions on both sides of the repo market and no slack in the box) by
modifying appropriately those mentioned in Comment 2.
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